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Abstract
Consider an election between k candidates in which each voter votes
randomly (but not necessarily independently) and suppose that there is
a single candidate that every voter prefers (in the sense that each voter is
more likely to vote for this special candidate than any other candidate).
Suppose we have a voting rule that takes all of the votes and produces a
single outcome and suppose that each individual voter has little effect on
the outcome of the voting rule. If the voting rule is a weighted plurality,
then we show that with high probability, the preferred candidate will win
the election. Conversely, we show that this statement fails for all other
reasonable voting rules.
This result is an extension of one by Ha¨ggstro¨m, Kalai and Mossel,
who proved the above in the case k = 2.
1 Introduction
For elections between two candidates, it is well known that voting rules in which
every voter has a small effect are good rules in the sense that they “aggregate
information well:” if every voter has a small bias towards the same candidate
then that candidate will win with overwhelming probability. When voters vote
independently, this fact was noted by Margulis [4] and Russo [5], whose results
were later strengthened by Kahn, Kalai and Linial [3] and by Talagrand [6].
When the voters are not independent, the situation is more complicated. It
is no longer true, then, that every reasonable voting rule aggregates well. In
fact, [2] show that if we want the aggregation to hold for every distribution of
the voters, then weighted majority functions are the only option. We extend
their result to the non-binary case.
The author would like to thank Elchanan Mossel for suggesting this problem
and providing fruitful discussions.
∗Department of Statistics, U.C. Berkeley. joeneeman@gmail.com
1
2 Definitions and results
In the introduction, we made a few allusions to “reasonable” voting rules. Let
us now say precisely what that means: we will require that our voting rules do
not have a built-in preference for any alternative. This is a common assumption,
and its definition is standard (see, eg. [1]). In what follows, the notation [k]
stands for the set {0, . . . , k − 1}.
Definition 2.1. A function f ∶ [k]n → [k] is neutral if f(σ(x)) = σ(f(x)) for
all x ∈ [k]n and all permutations σ on [k], where σ(x)i = σ(xi).
Note that in the case k = 2, a function is neutral if, and only if, it is anti-
symmetric according to the definition in [2].
Example 2.2
When k = 2 and n is odd, then the simple majority function (for which f(x) = 1
if #{i ∶ xi = 1} >#{i ∶ xi = 0}) is neutral. On the other hand, if n is even then in
order to fully specify the simple majority function, we need to say what happens
in the case of a tie; the choice of tie-breaking rule will determine whether the
resulting function is neutral. For example, if we define f(x) = x1 for every tied
configuration x, then f is neutral. On the other hand, if f(x) = 1 for every tied
configuration x, then f is not neutral.
The example can be extended to k ≥ 3. In this case, consider the tie-breaking
rule f(x) = xi where i is the smallest possible number for which xi is equal to
one of the tied alternatives. This tie-breaking rule is neutral, and it is more
natural than setting f(x) = x1 because it guarantees that the output of f is one
of the tied alternatives.
2.1 Weighted plurality functions
Let us say precisely what we mean by a weighted plurality function. The defini-
tion that we take here generalizes the definition from [2] of a weighted majority
function.
Definition 2.3. A function f ∶ [k]n → [k] is a weighted plurality function if
there exist weights w1, . . . ,wn ∈ R≥0 such that ∑iwi = 1 and for all a, b ∈ [k],
f(x) = a implies that
∑
i∶xi=a
wi ≥ ∑
i∶xi=b
wi.
Note that the above definition does not prescribe a particular behavior if a
tie occurs between two alternatives. If the weights are chosen so that ties never
occur, then the weighted plurality function is clearly neutral. Moreover, for any
set of weights we can construct a neutral weighted plurality function with those
weights by following the tie-breaking rule outlined in Example 2.2.
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2.2 The influence of a voter
The final notion that we need before stating our result is a way to quantify the
power of a single voter. When k = 2, the notion of effect is well-established
and can be found, for example, in [2]. However, there does not seem to be
a well-established way of quantifying the effect of voters for non-binary social
choice functions. Here, we propose a definition that closely resembles the one
used in [2] for binary functions.
Definition 2.4. Let f be a function [k]n → [k] and fix a probability distribution
P on [k]n. The effect of voter i is
ei(f,P ) =
k
∑
j=1
P (f(X) = j∣Xi = j) −P (f(X) = j∣Xi ≠ j),
where X is a random variable distributed according to P .
Note that for the case k = 2, the preceding definition reduces to
ei(f,P ) = 2(P (f(X) = 1∣Xi = 1) −P (f(X) = 1∣Xi = 0)),
which is just twice the definition in [2] of a voter’s effect. Also, the effect is
closely related to the correlation between the voters and the outcome:
P (f(X) = j∣Xi = j) −P (f(X) = j∣Xi ≠ j) =
Cov(1{f=j},1{Xi=j})
P (Xi = j)P (Xi ≠ j)
≥ 4Cov(1{f=j},1{Xi=j})
and so
ei(f,P ) ≥ 4∑
j
Cov(1{f=j},1{Xi=j}).
Example 2.5
The simplest example of ei(f,P ) is when P is a product measure (ie. the Xi are
independent) and the function f does not depend on its ith coordinate; in that
case, P (f(X) = j∣Xi = j) = P (f(X) = j∣Xi ≠ j) for all j and so ei(f,P ) = 0.
On the other hand, if P is a distribution such that X1 = X2 = ⋯ = Xn with
probability 1, and if f is a plurality function, then P (f(X) = j∣Xi = j) = 1 for
all j, while P (f(X) = j∣Xi ≠ j) = 0; hence, ei(f,P ) = 1 for all i.
For a less trivial example, suppose that theXi are independent and uniformly
distributed on [k]. Let f be an unweighted plurality function. Then the Central
Limit Theorem implies that ei(f,P ) = O( 1√n) as n →∞.
On the other hand, suppose that f is still an unweighted plurality function
and the Xi are independent, but now P (Xi = 1) > P (Xi = j) + δ for some
δ > 0 and all j ≠ 1. Then Hoeffding’s inequality implies that P (f(X) = 1∣Xi) ≥
1 − 2 exp(−δ2n/4) for sufficiently large n, regardless of the value of Xi. In
particular, this implies that ei(f,P ) = O(exp(−δ2n/4)). Compared to the case
where the Xi are uniformly distributed, this demonstrates that ei(f,P ) can
depend strongly on P , even when P is restricted to being a product measure.
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2.3 The main result
Our main theorem is the following:
Theorem 2.6. (a) For every δ > 0 and ǫ > 0, there is a τ > 0 such that for
every weighted plurality function f with weights wi and every probability
distribution P on [k]n, if ei(f,P ) ≤ τ and there is a set A ⊂ [n] such that
∑iwiP (Xi = a) ≥ ∑iwiP (Xi = b)+δ for all i ∈ [n], all a ∈ A and all b /∈ A,
then P (f(X) ∈ A) ≥ 1 − ǫ.
(b) If f is not a weighted plurality function then there exists a probability
distribution P on [k]n such that P (Xi = 2) > P (Xi = 1) for all i ∈ [n] but
P (f(X) = 1) = 1 (and hence ei(f,P ) = 0 for all i).
We remark that the Theorem is constructive in the sense that we can give
an algorithm (based on solving a linear program) which either constructs some
weights wi witnessing the fact that f is a weighted plurality, or a probability
distribution P satisfying part (b).
Parts (a) and (b) of Theorem 2.6 are converse to one another in the following
sense: under the hypothesis of small effects, part (a) says that if there is a gap
between the popularity of the most popular alternatives A and the less popular
alternatives Ac then a weighted plurality function will choose an alternative
in A. Part (b) shows that this property fails for every function that is not a
weighted plurality. Note that part (a) has an important special case, which is
closer to the statement of [2]: if P (Xi = a) ≥ P (Xi = b)+ δ for all i ∈ [n] and all
b ≠ a, then f(X) = a with high probability if the effects are small enough.
The remainder of the paper is devoted to the proof of Theorem 2.6.
Proof of Theorem 2.6 (a). This part of the proof follows very closely the argu-
ment in [2]. Suppose that f is a weighted plurality function with weights wi.
The first step is to show that f is “correlated” in some sense with each voter:
define pij = P (Xi = j) and letWj be the (random) weight assigned to alternative
j: Wj =∑i∶Xi=j wi. Then
E
n
∑
i=1
wi
k
∑
j=1
1{f(X)=j}(1{Xi=j} − pij)
= E
⎛
⎝∑i,j
wi1{f(X)=j}1{Xi=j} −∑
i,j
1{f(X)=j}wipij
⎞
⎠
= E∑
i,j
wi1{f(X)=j}1{Xi=j} −∑
j
P (f = j)EWj . (1)
Now, let αj = P (f = j) and set α˜j = αj/(∑i∈A αi) for j ∈ A and α˜j = 0 otherwise.
The first term of (1) is just
E∑
i,j
wi1{f(X)=j}1{Xi=j} = E∑
j
1{f(X)=j}Wj
≥ E∑
j
1{f(X)=j}∑
i
α˜iWi =∑
i
α˜iEWj (2)
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since the winning alternative always has at least as much weight as any con-
vex combination of alternatives. Since minj∈A EWj ≥ maxj/∈AEWj + δ, we can
plug (2) into (1) to obtain
(1) ≥∑
j
α˜jEWj −∑
j
αjEWj
≥ ∑
j∈A
(α˜j − αj)δ
= δP (f /∈ A).
Recalling that ei(f,P ) ≥ 4∑j Cov(1{f=j},1{Xi=j}), we have
δP (f /∈ A) ≤ E
n
∑
i=1
wi
k
∑
j=1
1{f(X)=j}(1{Xi=j} − pij)
≤
1
4
∑
i
wiei(f,P )
≤
τ
4
and so one direction of the theorem is proved once we take τ small enough that
ǫ ≥ τ/(4δ).
The proof of the second part of the theorem follows the idea of [2], in that
we use linear programming duality to find a witness for f being a weighted
plurality function. However, the details of the proof are quite different, since [2]
uses a well-known linear program (the fractional vertex cover of a hypergraph)
which does not extend beyond k = 2.
The proof idea is this: we will write down a linear program and its dual. If
the primal program has a large enough value it will turn out that f is a weighted
plurality function. Otherwise, the dual has a small value and the dual variables
witness the claim of Theorem 2.6 (b). In particular, note that this proof provides
the algorithm that we mentioned after the statement of Theorem 2.6.
First we make a trivial observation that will simplify our linear program
considerably: if a function is neutral, it is easier to check whether it is a weighted
plurality because it is not necessary to try all possible combinations of a, b ∈ [k]:
Proposition 2.7. Suppose f ∶ [k]n → [k] is neutral. Then f is a weighted
plurality if and only if there exist weights w1, . . . ,wn ∈ R such that f(x) = 1
implies that
∑
i∶xi=1
wi ≥ ∑
i∶xi=2
wi.
We can write a linear program for checking whether a given neutral function
f is a weighted plurality. The variables for this program are t; wi for each
i ∈ [n] and gx for each x ∈ [k]n for which f(x) = 1. In standard form, the primal
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program is the following:
maximize t+ − t−
subject to gx ≥ 0 for all x ∈ [k]n such that f(x) = 1
wi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [n]
t+ ≥ 0 and t− ≥ 0
∑
i
wi = 1
∑
i∶xi=1
wi − ∑
i∶xi=2
wi − gx − (t+ − t−) = 0 for all x ∈ [k]n with f(x) = 1.
Proposition 2.8. Let t∗ be the value of the above linear program. If t∗ ≥ 0 then
f is a weighted plurality function.
Proof. Let wi, gx, t+ and t− be feasible points such that t+ − t− ≥ 0. Then, for
all x with f(x) = 1,
∑
i∶xi=1
wi − ∑
i∶xi=2
wi = gx + (t+ − t−) ≥ 0
and so f satisfies the conditions of Proposition 2.7.
Now consider the dual program; since the primal is in standard form, the
dual is easy to write down. Let the dual variables be a and qx for all x such
that f(x) = 1. Then the dual program is:
minimize a+ − a−
subject to ∑
x∶f(x)=1
qx ≤ −1
∑
x∶f(x)=1
(1{xi=1} − 1{xi=2})qx + (a+ − a−) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [n]
qx ≤ 0 for all x such that f(x) = 1
a+ ≤ 0 and a− ≤ 0.
Proposition 2.9. Let a∗ be the value of the above dual program. If a∗ < 0 then
there exists a probability distribution on [k]n such that P (Xi = 2) > P (Xi = 1)
for all i but f(X) = 1 almost surely.
Proof. Choose a feasible point with a+ − a− < 0 and define px = −qx/(∑x qx).
Then px ≥ 0 and ∑x px = 1, so we can define a probability distribution by
P (X = x) = px when f(x) = 1 and P (X = x) = 0 otherwise. Under this
distribution, f(X) = 1 with probability 1. On the other hand, with a+ − a− < 0
the constraints of the dual program imply that
∑
x∶f(x)=1
1{xi=1}qx > ∑
x∶f(x)=1
1{xi=2}qx
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for all i. Thus,
P (Xi = 1) = ∑
x∶f(x)=1
1{xi=1}px < ∑
x∶f(x)=1
1{xi=2}px = P (Xi = 2)
for all i.
To conclude the proof of Theorem 2.6, note that both the primal and dual
programs are feasible and bounded and so a∗ = t∗.
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